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No area of South African law is more critical than the prohibition of unfair 
discrimination, especially in the workplace. Under apartheid, discrimination against 
workers on grounds such as race and sex was not only permitted; it was legally enforced. 
In addition, employers had a relatively free hand to discriminate on grounds such as 
religion, disability or political opinion. No stable economy, let alone a democratic 
society, can be built on such foundations. The eradication of ―unfair discrimination‖ in 
the workplace was essential to developing the new employment dispensation envisaged 
by the Constitution
1
 and the Labour Relations Act of 1995 (‗LRA‘). Section 6 of the 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (‗EEA‘) now embodies this objective. 
It is important to note the relationship between the Constitution and the EEA. Section 9 
of the Constitution states that ―[n]ational legislation must be enacted to prevent or 
prohibit unfair discrimination‖. This is because the Constitution is primarily intended to 
regulate the exercise of State power, while statutes are enacted to give effect to basic 
constitutional rights. The role of the EEA is to implement the basic right contained in 
section 9 of the Constitution in the context of employment policies and practices. Thus 
the EEA, and not the Constitution, must be relied on by employees alleging unfair 
discrimination. Only if a statute (or the common law) fails to protect a basic right does it 
become permissible to rely directly on the Constitution.
2
 In the case of unfair 
discrimination, however, the protection given to employees by the EEA is more extensive 
and more specific than the basic right entrenched in the Constitution. In the employment 
context, therefore, case law dealing with the broad constitutional meaning of ―unfair 
discrimination‖ in other situations (for example, the imposition of different municipal 
tariffs in different parts of a city) may not always be relevant. 
                                               
* The issues dealt with in the first part of this paper are discussed in more detail in Du Toit ―The evolution 
of the concept of ‗unfair discrimination‘ in South African labour law‖ (2006) 27 Industrial Law Journal 
1311. 
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
2 See Institute for Democracy in SA and Others v African National Congress 2005 (10) BCLR 995 (C) at 
par 17; Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd and Others 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 
437. This is so even though the courts have in a few cases (incorrectly) allowed an employee to rely 
directly on the Constitution: see, for example, Stokwe v MEC, Department of Education, Eastern Cape 
Province [2005] 8 BLLR 822 (LC). 
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This also means that employers are limited to the defences contained in the EEA and 
cannot rely on the broader defences that are available to the State – for example, when 
passing laws that differentiate between different groups of people (such as married and 
unmarried people).
3
 This follows from the principle that any limitation of a basic right 
must be interpreted narrowly (i.e., to limit the basic right as little as possible).
4
 In relation 
to the right to equality, this means that laws are presumed to treat people equally; unequal 
treatment is permissible only where it is expressly authorised by law
5
 and such law does 
not violate any of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution, or by international law, 
to an impermissible degree. The EEA, as will be seen, authorises unequal treatment in 
only two instances. 
To sum up: in practice, the prohibition of unfair discrimination in the workplace is 
regulated by the EEA and not by the Constitution. The concept of ―unfair discrimination‖ 
contained in the EEA, in turn, has been interpreted by the courts in the light of the 
Constitution and international law. In the process, it will be seen, much difficulty has 
been experienced in clarifying the difference between affirmative action measures and 
unfair discrimination. These topics form the main focus of this paper.  
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF “UNFAIR” DISCRIMINATION 
In the first reported labour cases where the term ―discrimination‖ was used, the Industrial 
Court was concerned with discrimination against trade unions or trade union members.
6
 
Two things are interesting about these early judgments. One is that the court made 
reference to the prohibition of ―anti-union discrimination‖ contained in the relevant 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention; even at that stage, in other words, it 
was accepted that labour rights in South Africa must be interpreted in the light of 
international law. Secondly, it was not found necessary to use the term ―unfair‖. 
Discrimination, in line with international law, was prohibited if it took place on an 
impermissible ground or for an impermissible reason.  
For the next ten years it was left to the Industrial Court to strike down cases of 





 and trade union membership.
9
 Thus, dismissal of a female employee after 
having an affair with a senior male employee,
10
 and the refusal by a white trade union to 
                                               
3 Section 36 of the Constitution (the ―limitation clause‖) sets out the criteria for deciding whether a 
limitation of a basic right by statute or by common law is permissible. 
4 For a leading European case on this point, see Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651 (ECJ) where it was ruled that the employment of women in the police 
force could not be limited on grounds of ―security‖ because the relevant European law made no provision 
for such a limitation. 
5 This was the case even before the enactment of our Bill of Rights: see R v Abdurahman 1950 (3) SA 136 
(A) at 145; S v De Wet1978 (2) SA 515 (T) at 517-518; cited in Chamber of Mines v Mineworkers Union 
(1989) 10 ILJ 133 (IC) at 157. 
6 See Raad van Mynvakbonde v Minister van Mannekrag en ‘n Ander (1983) 4 ILJ 202 (T); UAMAWU & 
Others v Fodens (SA) (Pty) Lt. (1983) 4 ILJ 212 (IC). 
7 E.g., Chamber of Mines v MWU (1989) 10 ILJ 133 (IC). 
8 E,g., J v M Ltd (1989) 10 ILJ 755 (IC). 
9 Mtshamba & others v Boland Houtnywerhede (1986) 7 ILJ 563 (IC). 
10 G v K (1988) 9 ILJ 314 (IC).  
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allow its members to train coloured workers,
11
 were held to be unfair labour practices. In 
the process the meaning of ―discrimination‖ was considered in more detail. In particular, 
a distinction was drawn between ―differentiation‖ (i.e., treating people differently on 
permissible grounds) and ―discrimination‖ (i.e., treating people unequally on 
impermissible grounds).
12
 Very importantly, ILO Convention 111 of 1958 on 
Discrimination in Employment and Occupation was recognised as a point of reference in 
defining ―discrimination‖. In SACWU & Others v Sentrachem Ltd
13
 the Industrial Court, 
faced with a case of alleged wage discrimination based on race, quoted the Convention as 
follows: 
―Discrimination is defined in the convention as including ‗any distinction, exclusion or 
preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national 
extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of 
opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation‘. There are, however, limits, 
[with] art 1 s 1(2) stating: ‗Any distinction, exclusion or preference in respect of a 
particular job based on the inherent requirements thereof is not deemed to be 
discrimination.‘.‖ 
This definition (reproduced in full at the end of the paper) will be referred to again, and 
should be kept in mind.  
The concept of ―unfair discrimination‖, as opposed to ―discrimination‖ on a prohibited 
ground, first made its appearance in the short-lived codification of ―unfair labour 
practice‖ that was enacted in1988 and repealed in 1991. Paragraph (i) of the definition 
stated that ―unfair labour practice‖ would include ―the unfair discrimination by any 
employer against any employee solely on the grounds of race, sex or creed‖.  
Did the introduction of the word ―unfair‖ mean a narrowing down of the prohibition of 
discrimination? In other words, was discrimination on the grounds of race, sex or creed 
prohibited only if the court considered it ―unfair‖, thus leaving employers free to 
discriminate on these grounds if the court considered it ―fair‖? Even though the apartheid 
government might well have intended this, the courts did not interpret it in such a way. 
For example, in Chamber of Mines v Council of Mining Unions
14
 it was found that the 
employer had discriminated unfairly against black workers by not affording them 
―exactly the same conditions of employment [as] their white counterparts solely on the 
grounds of race‖. Discrimination based on race, in other words, was assumed to be 
unfair; it was not found necessary to inquire whether it was ―fair‖ in the circumstances. 
To sum up the position prior to 1993: distinctions (or ―differentiation‖) among employees 
were permissible provided they were based on valid or work-related grounds. ―Unfair 
discrimination‖ meant unequal treatment based on impermissible grounds such as race, 
sex or creed, and was prohibited. The courts, in practice, treated the word ―unfair‖ as an 
                                               
11 Chamber of Mines v MWU (1989) 10 ILJ 133 (IC). 
12 See, for example, Biyela & Others v Sneller Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (1985) 6 ILJ 33 (IC) where the court 
found that it did not amount to ―racial discrimination‖ to dismiss only African workers where, following a 
strike by African and Indian workers, the Indian workers had heeded the employers‘ ultimatum to return to 
work.  
13 (1988) 9 ILJ 410 (IC) at 429; cited with approval in Chamber of Mines v MWU (1989) 10 ILJ 133 (IC) at 
157.  
14 (1990) 11 ILJ 52 (IC) at 69. 
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open-ended term referring to discrimination on all grounds that were found to be 





1993–1999: FROM THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION TO THE EEA 
The interim Constitution
16
, which took effect in April 1994, contained the first blanket 
prohibition of ―unfair discrimination‖ in all walks of life. Section 8 stated that ―[n]o 
person shall be unfairly discriminated against‖ on any ground, including a number of 
listed grounds such as race, sex and religion.  Importantly, it also stipulated that 
affirmative action measures were not prohibited. For the next two years, while the 
Industrial Court continued to exercise its unfair labour practice jurisdiction, the effect 
was that discrimination in the workplace on any of the grounds listed in section 8 had to 
be treated as an unfair labour practice. 
The interim Constitution further prohibited ―indirect‖ as well as ―direct‖ discrimination. 
By ―direct‖ discrimination is meant discrimination based expressly on a particular 
ground; for example, refusing to employ a person because she is a woman. By ―indirect‖ 
discrimination is meant a seemingly neutral measure which, however, has the effect of 
discriminating against a particular group of people and has no objective justification; for 
example, giving fewer leave days to employees on fixed-term contract where, in fact, 
most of them are women. 
The judgments of the Industrial Court in this period, unfortunately, were not very clear 
and helped to lay the basis for subsequent confusion. Two cases may be noted. In Collins 
v Volkskas Bank
17
 a pregnant employee was denied maternity leave in terms of a 
collective agreement and was thus forced to resign. Referring to ILO Convention 111, the 
court correctly found that inherent job requirements (or ―business necessity‖) was the 
only defence available to the employer, but went on to describe measures based on 
inherent job requirements as ―acceptable‖ or ―fair‖ discrimination. In fact, Convention 
111 clearly states that such measures are ―not deemed to be discrimination‖. However, 
because the discrimination that Ms Collins suffered was ―a result of her pregnancy‖, it 
was by definition unfair. In effect, ―unfair‖ was used as the equivalent of ―impermissible‖ 
in describing the types of discrimination that were prohibited by the Constitution.  
The same confusing notion of ―fair‖ discrimination surfaced in Association of 
Professional Teachers & Another v Minister of Education,
18
 where it was ruled that 
denying a home owner‘s allowance to married women teachers amounted to sex 
discrimination and was therefore an unfair labour practice. Correctly, the court 
distinguished ―discrimination‖ from ―differentiation, stating that ―where the effect of the 
differentiation is not based on an objective ground and such differentiation has the effect 
of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons on an 
                                               
15 See, for example, Mthembu & Others v Claude Neon Lights (1992) 13 ILJ 422 (IC), dealing with alleged 
discrimination based on union membership. For a similar interpretation, see Cameron, Cheadle and 
Thompson The New Labour Relations Act (Juta, 1989) at 161–162. 
16 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
17 (1994) 15 ILJ 1398 (IC). 
18 [1995] 9 BLLR 29 (IC). 
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equal footing of all rights and freedoms, it would constitute discrimination‖.
19
 However, 
it then stated that the term ―unfair‖ serves ―to limit those distinctions or forms of 
discrimination which are outlawed in this section to those which are ‗unfair‘‖
20
  – in other 
words, that discrimination based on listed grounds (such as sex) is prohibited only if it is 
found to be ―unfair‖. But, having said that, the court went on to suggest the opposite: the 
term ―unfair‖, it ruled, serves to distinguish measures that that merely ―differentiate‖ 
from those that ―discriminate‖. ―[U]nless the inherent requirements of the job require 
differentiation on the grounds of colour or sex,‖ it was held, ―direct differentiation based 
on such inherent human characteristics should not be condoned.‖
21
 This, it is submitted, 
was more accurate, but left the notion of ―fair discrimination‖ hanging in the air.  
In 1997 the final Constitution took effect, containing a prohibition of ―unfair 
discrimination‖ very similar to that in the interim Constitution (see section 9, annexed at 
the end of this paper). In Hoffmann v South African Airways
22
 the Constitutional Court 
set out to interpret the meaning of unfair discrimination in terms of section 9.
23
 As is well 
known, the case was about the refusal of SAA to employ Mr Hoffmann as a cabin 
attendant because he was HIV-positive. Since HIV status was not a listed ground of 
discrimination, it was necessary to establish whether it was prohibited by section 9.  The 
employer‘s original defence, based on the inherent requirements of the job, had by this 
stage been abandoned. Using the impact of the employer‘s conduct on the applicant as its 
criterion, the court concluded that ―the denial of employment to the appellant because he 
was living with HIV impaired his dignity and constituted unfair discrimination‖.
24
  
In the meantime the LRA had been enacted, abolishing the Industrial Court and laying 
down a prohibition of unfair discrimination on listed or unlisted grounds similar to that in 
the Constitution, but applicable exclusively in the employment context (Schedule 7, item 
2(1)(a)). In addition to affirmative action measures (as provided for in both the 
Constitution and ILO Convention 111), it included ―inherent requirements of a particular 
job‖ as a defence available to employers. Then, in 1997, South Africa ratified Convention 
111, and in 1998 the EEA was enacted, replacing item 2(1)(a) with a similar prohibition 
of unfair discrimination plus the same two defences (see section 6, annexed at the end of 
this paper). One purpose of the EEA, as noted already, was to implement the 
constitutional prohibition of unfair discrimination in the workplace; another was to give 
effect to the requirements of Convention 111. As will be noted below, this made it 
necessary to interpret the EEA in line with the Convention – in particular, to give ―unfair 
discrimination‖ in terms of section 6 the same meaning as that of ―discrimination‖ in 
terms of the Convention.  
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONVENTION 111 
                                               
19 At 59. 
20 At 61.  
21 At 64. 
22 [2000] 12 BLLR 1365 (CC). 
23 The LRA had not yet taken effect when the dispute arose. 
24 At par 40. 
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The first case dealing a claim of unfair discrimination in terms of the LRA, Leonard 
Dingler Employee Representative Council & others v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd,
25
 
created some confusion. The case arose from the unequal treatment of monthly-paid and 
weekly-paid employees for purposes of pension fund membership in a workplace where 
all weekly-paid employees were black and most monthly-paid employees were white. 
This, the court found, amounted to indirect discrimination based on race. It went on, 
however, to suggest that ―discrimination‖ may be justified if ―the object [is] legitimate 
and the means proportional and rational‖
26
 – in other words, that employers can plead  
―fairness‖ in general, in addition to the two defences mentioned in the Act, to justify 
alleged discrimination even on listed grounds. 
If this was so, it would be in direct conflict with ILO Convention 111 and, therefore, with 
the Constitution, the LRA and the EEA (which must all be interpreted in accordance with 
international law). In fact, the court did not disagree with Convention 111; it used the 
term ―discrimination‖ as not implying ―actual prejudice‖ but, rather, distinctions based on 
―characteristics which are generalised assumptions about groups of people.‖
27
 In other 
words, the court was speaking not of ―discrimination‖ as defined in the Convention but of 
―generalised assumptions‖, which might potentially be justified on grounds of ―fairness‖. 
Unfortunately the judgment has been used to suggest that discrimination on prohibited 
grounds may also be justified on grounds of ―fairness‖, thus greatly reducing the 
protection available to employees. 
Some of the confusion was removed by later judgments. The Constitutional Court re-
emphasised the distinction between ―differentiation‖ and ―discrimination‖,
28
 as did the 
labour courts. The approach to be followed in establishing whether an employer has 
committed unfair discrimination was summarised by the Labour Appeal Court in Mias v 
Minister of Justice & Others
29
 as follows:  
―In short: Is there a differentiation? If so, is it discriminatory? If so, is it unfair either 
directly, on one or more of the specified grounds, or indirectly?‖ 
This, it is submitted, is broadly the sense in which section 6 of the EEA should be 
understood. Section 3(d) of the EEA states expressly that the Act must be interpreted ―in 
compliance with‖ Convention 111. This means that ―discrimination‖ (as defined by 
Convention 111) is ―unfair‖ (prohibited) if it takes place on any of the grounds listed in 
section 6 or on an unlisted ground which ―has the effect of nullifying or impairing 
equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation of employees in an 
equivalent manner‖ (for example, nationality). Unequal treatment of employees on listed 
or unlisted grounds, however, will not constitute ―unfair discrimination‖ if it is justified 
in terms of (a) an affirmative action measure or (b) an inherent requirement of the job. 
Both these defences are expressly allowed by Convention 111. Failing this, an employer 
would have to show that its conduct (i) did not amount to ―discrimination‖ but was 
merely ―differentiation‖ (for example, providing separate toilet facilities for men and 
                                               
25 [1997] 11 BLLR 1438 (LC). 
26 At 1448.  
27 At 1448. 
28 See especially Harksen v Lane NO 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC). 
29 [2002] 1 BLLR 1 (LAC) at par 21. 
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women) or (ii) was based on a legitimate or permissible ground (for example, a 
disciplinary code). 
Unfortunately, with few exceptions, the courts have not adhered to the approach outlined 
in the Mias case (above). While little fault can be found with the remedies ordered in 
most cases, the reasoning of the court was often unclear and key concepts were blurred – 
in particular, the meaning of ―discrimination‖. The problem is not only technical; it 
potentially undermines the protection available to workers. In the absence of clear legal 
rules, or where existing legal rules (such as the definition of ―discrimination‖) are not 
applied, it is left to judges to seek the law where they can find it. In the case of section 6 
of the EEA, the relatively broad and sophisticated interpretation given to ―unfair 
discrimination‖ in terms of the constitutional test has become a popular and seemingly 
authoritative criterion. The effect, it is suggested, is to obscure the clear meaning of 
―discrimination‖ as targeted by Convention 111 and make room for a subjective element 
to enter the exercise, with unpredictable results.  
 
RECENT CASE LAW 
On the positive side, the recent decision in HOSPERSA obo Venter v SA Nursing 
Council
30
 promised to bring much-needed clarity to the meaning of ―discrimination‖. In 
this matter the applicant had been employed subject to a retirement age of 70 with the 
option of retiring at 65. Subsequently all employees of the SA Nursing Council were 
transferred to a new interim council which, after unilaterally laying down a new 
retirement age of 60, refused to allow Ms Venter to work beyond the age of 61. Ms 
Venter then brought a claim of unfair discrimination on the ground of age. In deciding 
whether such discrimination had taken place, Acting Judge Steenkamp found that the test 
was whether the applicant‘s treatment had been based on her age, not whether she had 
been treated differently from other employees of the same age. Having referred to ILO 
Convention 111 to establish the meaning of ―discrimination‖, the court then concluded 
that age discrimination is ―absolutely prohibited‖ in terms of the Convention as well as 
the EEA. It was noted that the Nursing Council did not try to justify its decision in terms 
of the inherent requirements of the job. Interestingly, the court accepted that the defence 
to a claim of automatically unfair dismissal based on age in terms of the LRA – i.e., that 
the employee had reached an agreed or normal retiring age – could also be used as a 
defence to a claim of age discrimination. The employer, however, was unable to establish 
this defence. The court accordingly found that Ms Venter‘s dismissal amounted to age 
discrimination and ordered compensation equal to the difference between the salary she 
would have earned until the age of 65 (when she intended to retire) and her pension for 
that period. The judgment is now on appeal. 
Other judgments, unfortunately, were less helpful. A scenario similar to that in Venter 
arose in Evans v Japanese School of Johannesburg.
31
 Again the applicant was forced to 
retire at an age unilaterally determined by the employer. In this case, however, the 
applicant claimed automatically unfair dismissal as well as unfair discrimination based on 
age and, having succeeded on both counts, was awarded compensation equal to 24 
                                               
30 [2006] 6 BLLR 558 (LC).  
31 [2006] 12 BLLR 1146 (LC). 
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months‘ remuneration, plus R200 000 damages in terms of the EEA, plus R29 524 notice 
pay. The judgment, however, followed a less clear route. Unlike in the Venter case, the 
court made no attempt to define the meaning of ―discrimination‖, and found that the 
unfairness suffered by Ms Evans consisted of being treated differently from other 
employees who had been allowed to continue working after the age of 60. This is 
problematic; for example, what if – as in the case of Ms Venter – there had been no other 
employees in a similar position to compare her treatment with? It is submitted that, as in 
the Venter case, it should be enough to prove that the disadvantage suffered by the 
employee was based on a prohibited ground, even if there are no other employees in a 
similar position who were treated differently. 
A case that attracted considerable attention was SATAWU obo Finca v Old Mutual Life 
Assurance Company (SA) Ltd & another.
32
 The dispute in this matter was sparked by 
racist comments made by a white employee, Ms Burger, about two black fellow-
employees. Although the comments had been made behind the victims‘ backs, word got 
out and action was demanded of the employer. However, little happened: Burger‘s 
supervisor allegedly issued her with a verbal warning and Burger apologised to the black 
employees concerned. Despite ongoing complaints from the applicant union about the 
lack of action, nothing further was done until the matter was presented to its Employment 
Equity Manager. A fact-finding inquiry and a disciplinary hearing then took place, 
resulting in Burger‘s dismissal. This, however, was reversed on appeal on the grounds 
that Burger had suffered ―double jeopardy‖ (a warning followed by a disciplinary hearing 
for the same offence) and that the employer had stated that no further action would be 
taken. The union then referred a claim of unfair discrimination to the Labour Court on 
behalf of one of the victims.  
The judgment of the court is noteworthy for several reasons. On the negative side, the 
claim was heard with reference to the Constitution as well as the EEA when, for reasons 
already mentioned, it should have been dealt with in terms of the EEA. The court also did 
not make clear the criteria it used in deciding whether the racial abuse suffered by the 
applicant amounted to ―discrimination‖, and went on to find that Burger‘s conduct 
amounted to direct discrimination in terms of the Constitution rather than the EEA. 
However, there can be little question that racial abuse has the effect of ―nullifying or 
impairing equality of opportunity or treatment‖ in terms of Convention 111 and, 
therefore, amounts to unfair discrimination also in terms of the EEA.
33
 At the same time, 
Judge Revelas broke new ground by ruling that the EEA applies to unfair discrimination 
not only by an employer against an employee but also by one employee against another. 
The employer, however, was held liable on the ground that its ―failure to take proper 
steps to prevent racism being perpetrated at the workplace by certain of its employees‖ 
constituted unfair discrimination against the complainant. Although the judge declined to 
interfere with the reversal of Burger‘s dismissal (on the grounds that the fairness of a 
                                               
32 [2006] 8 BLLR 737 (LC). 
 
33 Section 6(3) of the EEA further states that ―harassment‖ on a listed ground amounts to unfair 
discrimination. As in the case of sexual harassment, it can be argued that a single serious incident of racial 
abuse can be regarded as racial harassment, and thus falls within the scope of section 6. 
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dismissal should be decided in terms of the LRA, not the EEA) she ordered compensation 
to be paid to the complainant in terms of an agreement between the parties. 
Less problematic was the judgment in Wallace v Du Toit.
34
 In this matter an au pair, who 
had been dismissed by her employer (an attorney) after falling pregnant, claimed (i) 
compensation for automatically unfair dismissal in terms of the LRA and (ii) damages for 
unfair discrimination in terms of the EEA. The employer‘s defence was that it had been 
agreed that the applicant‘s employment would end if she fell pregnant. Even if this were 
true, it was found, such a provision would have been unconstitutional. The court then 
dealt with the substance of the claim. Again the existence of ―discrimination‖ was 
assumed, again with reference to the Constitution rather than the EEA. Reverting to the 
EEA, Acting Judge Pillemer then found that not having children could not be regarded as 
an inherent requirement of the applicant‘s job. Her dismissal because of pregnancy, 
therefore, was not only automatically unfair but also amounted to unfair discrimination. 
Though mindful of possible unfairness to a respondent where claims are duplicated, the 
court noted that compensation for unfair dismissal is in addition to any other remedy to 
which an applicant may be entitled (section 195, LRA). Damages of R25 000 were 
awarded for the unfair discrimination which the applicant had suffered plus R46 500 as 
compensation for unfair dismissal, calculated with reference to her loss of earnings. 
By contrast, major uncertainty arises from Dlamini & others v Green Four Security.
35
 
The applicants in this matter were security guards belonging to a religious group which, 
they claimed, did not allow them to trim their beards. Since the company‘s rules required 
its employees to be clean-shaven, the applicants were in due course given disciplinary 
hearings and dismissed. This, they alleged, amounted to discrimination on the grounds of 
their religion and was therefore automatically unfair dismissal in terms of section 
187(1)(f) of the LRA. The claim failed because the applicants could not show that their 
religion, in fact, prohibited them from trimming their beards. Unfortunately, in reaching 
this conclusion the court made a number of problematic findings. First, it ruled that the 
issue had to be decided in terms of the Constitution (because the ―source‖ of section 
187(1)(f) is in the Constitution) and not in terms of the LRA. For reasons noted already, 
this is questionable; if it were so, all labour disputes would need to be decided in terms of 
the Constitution because the major ―source‖ of labour rights is the constitutional right to 
fair labour practices. In fact, the criteria used in determining the limits of basic rights in 
terms of the Constitution are very different from those used in deciding whether an 
employer has breached an employee‘s basic rights. But, having taken this step, the court 
went on to rule that a three-stage inquiry was necessary: 
“Stage one: Are the facts relied upon to substantiate the complaint of discrimination 
proved?  
“Stage two: If discrimination is proved, is it justified? At this stage the court must 
establish whether the workplace rule can be justified as an IROJ [inherent requirement of 
the job].  
                                               
34 [2006] 8 BLLR 757 (LC). 
35 (2006) 27 ILJ 2098 (LC). 
 10 
“Stage three: If it is an IROJ, it may still be discriminatory, if the impact is not 
ameliorated by a reasonable accommodation or modification of the rule, or an exemption 
from it.‖
36
   
In fact, in terms of the EEA ―discrimination‖ and an ―inherent requirement of a job‖ are 
mutually exclusive. Convention 111 states that a measure based on an inherent 
requirement of a job is ―not discrimination‖; or, to put it differently, ―discrimination‖ can 
only be proved if the employer‘s conduct is not based on an inherent requirement of the 
job. In the same vein, section 187(2)(a) states that a dismissal based on an inherent 
requirement of a job ―may be fair‖. In practice, this means that such a dismissal will be 
fair (and therefore not ―discriminatory‖) provided it is also procedurally fair. If this is 
correct, stages one and two above are incorrect: if discrimination is proved, it means that 
the defence of ―IROJ‖ has failed whereas, if the rule does amount to an ―IROJ‖, it means 
that the complaint of discrimination must fail.  
―Stage three‖ is equally problematic. The question of ―accommodating‖ the employee 
will only arise in judging the substantive fairness of the dismissal, not in deciding 
whether it is discriminatory.  
The court, unfortunately, went even further. Being clean-shaven, it found, was an 
inherent requirement of the applicants‘ jobs because ―neatness‖ is generally enforced in 
the military, police and security industries. It is submitted that this is also incorrect. 
Previous cases had made it clear that this defence must be narrowly interpreted; an 
―inherent‖ requirement of a job means a requirement without which the job cannot be 
performed. Having an untrimmed beard, however, does not prevent a person from 
performing the job of a security guard. The court, it would seem, was confusing the 
concept of a ―reasonable workplace rule‖ with that of ―an inherent requirement of a job‖. 
Refusing to trim their beards may well have amounted to breach of a workplace rule and 
justified disciplinary proceedings; this, indeed, was the basis for the applicants‘ dismissal. 
Treating it as an inherent requirement of the job, however, means that it could have 
served as a defence even if having an untrimmed beard had indeed been a requirement of 
the applicants‘ religion. The very purpose of section 6 is to strike down employment 
practices, no matter how widespread they may be, that discriminate unfairly against 
employees. Giving them the status of ―inherent requirements of a job‖ allows them to 
continue. 
The courts also continued to have difficulty in distinguishing affirmative action measures 
from discrimination based on race or gender. In terms of the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (‗PEPUDA‘), this confusion to some 
extent arises from the wording of the statute (see sections 1 and 13).  Defining 
―discrimination‖ as any act ―including a policy or practice which directly or indirectly 
imposes a disadvantage or withholds a benefit from any person on one or more of the 
prohibited grounds‖ (such as race or gender), the Act then states that, if ―discrimination‖ 
is established, the burden is on the respondent to show that it is fair. The consequences 
were shown in Du Preez v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & 
others,
37
 where a highly experienced (white) magistrate claimed that he had been unfairly 
                                               
36 At 2104. 
37 [2006] 8 BLLR 767 (SE). 
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discriminated against by selection criteria which excluded him from being considered for 
appointment to the Port Elizabeth Regional Court. Since magistrates are not 
―employees‖, the case was decided in terms of PEPUDA. The Department‘s defence was 
that the selection criteria were justified by its affirmative action policy. On the one hand 
the court recognised that affirmative action measures ―must be seen as essential and 
integral to the goal of equality; and not as limitations of or exceptions to the equality 
rights‖. In terms of the definition of ―discrimination‖ in PEPUDA, however, it found that 
the applicant‘s exclusion from the selection process amounted to ―discrimination‖ and, 
therefore, it was necessary to consider whether it was ―fair‖. Although the Constitution 
requires that ―the need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender 
composition of South Africa must be considered when judicial officers are appointed‖ 
(section 174(2)), the court noted that this is not the only criterion; other criteria such as 
experience, legal knowledge, leadership and management skills must also be taken into 
account. But this had not been done; black women with minimum qualifications 
automatically prevailed over all other applicants. The Department‘s actions were 
therefore held to be unfair and it was ordered to readvertise the posts. 
Under the EEA, it is submitted, a similar ―two-stage‖ approach would be unnecessary 
since the EEA expressly excludes affirmative action measures from the scope of ―unfair 
discrimination‖. The remainder of the judgment, however, confirms earlier rulings in 
terms of the Constitution, the LRA and the EEA that the promotion of employment 
equity is by no means the only duty of the State. For example, all spheres of government 
are required to provide ―effective‖ government and must take this into account when 
making appointments. Also in the private sector, employers are expected to strike a 




In Baxter v National Commissioner, Correctional Services & another
39
 the affirmative 
action policy of a public sector employer again came under scrutiny. In this matter the 
appointment of Mr Baxter, a ―Coloured‖ male, to a senior position in the Free State was 
vetoed on the ground that ―[t]he issue of equity should first be addressed properly‖. 
When the post was re-advertised, Mr Baxter was not shortlisted. In examining the 
procedure that was followed, Judge Cele noted that the National Commissioner had 
neither approved nor rejected the decision not to appoint Mr Baxter, which amounted to a 
gross irregularity. Moreover, the Department‘s employment equity plan for the Free State 
called for the appointment of a Coloured person rather than an African. Due to these 
errors the Department‘s defence of affirmative action failed and its exclusion of Mr 
Baxter was held to be ―discrimination based on race and gender‖. The Department was 
accordingly ordered to pay him the salary and benefits to which he would have been 
entitled had he been appointed, backdated to January 2002, plus interest. 
Again, unfortunately, the reasoning of the court was ambiguous. Although it was not in 
dispute that the Department was seeking to implement an employment equity plan, the 
court appeared to accept that affirmative action measures amount to ―prima facie unfair 
                                               
38 See, e.g., McInnes v Technikon Natal [2000] 6 BLLR 701 (LC), where the Technikon‘s duty to ―provide 
the highest standard of tertiary service to its students‖ was balanced against its duty to implement 
affirmative action measures when appointing lecturers. 
39 [2006] 9 BLLR 844 (LC). 
 12 
discrimination‖ which the employer must show to be ―fair‖. This perpetuates the notion 
of affirmative action as a form of ―fair discrimination‖ and, therefore, a limitation of the 
right to equal treatment which must be interpreted narrowly (see above).
40
  In fact, the 
Constitution, Convention 111 and the EEA all treat affirmative action as a category in its 
own right which is excluded from the ambit of ―discrimination‖ and should be interpreted 
as broadly as is necessary to promote the objective of substantive equality. In this regard 
the approach adopted in earlier decisions such as Stoman v Minister of Safety & Security 
& Others
41
 is more consistent and is to be preferred. 
 
CONCLUSION 
What is the importance of these issues from a trade union perspective? 
There is a perception that trade unions give priority to collective bargaining issues and to 
rights issues that are directly relevant to collective bargaining (for example, 
organisational rights). In fact, individual disputes, many of them referred by trade unions, 
form the bulk of the CCMA‘s workload. Most of these, however, are dismissal disputes. 
Unfair discrimination disputes are few and far between. From April 2003 to March 2004, 
for example, a total of 1 053 unfair discrimination disputes were referred to the CCMA – 
less than one per cent of the total number of disputes. Also, many of these disputes 
involved relatively senior employees. Why are so few discrimination disputes referred by 
or on behalf of workers in less senior positions, who form the overwhelming majority of 
the workforce?  
The question must be answered with caution. There is little factual information available; 
the experience of trade unions themselves will shed more light on the issue. Subject to 
this proviso, the following propositions are suggested for discussion: 
1. The small number of unfair discrimination disputes does not mean that unfair 
discrimination has ceased to be a problem in South African workplaces. 
Discriminatory practices remain deeply ingrained in many workplaces, large as 
well as small, so much so that many workers may regard them as the norm. 
2. While direct racial discrimination may be less frequent, being highly visible and 
explosive, other forms of discrimination – for example, based on sex, disability or 
religion – remain rife. In particular, indirect discrimination may be widespread 
but is less easy to bring to light. 
3. It is easier for more skilled, educated and better-paid employees to raise 
complaints of unfair discrimination than for the majority of workers. The latter, in 
particular, will need union assistance in exposing the discriminatory practices to 
which they may be subject. 
                                               
40 See also Henn v SA Technical (Pty) Ltd (2006) 27 ILJ 2617 (LC) where the employer purported to 
concede that an affirmative action measure amounted to ―discrimination‖ on the ground of race. The court, 
instead of questioning this concession, held that the employer bore the burden of proving that its 
―discrimination‖ was ―fair‖. 
41 (2002) 23 ILJ 1010 (T). See also the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Minister of Finance & 
another v Van Heerden [2004] 12 BLLR 1181 (CC). 
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4. Unions need to make special efforts to communicate with their members about 
these issues, encourage them to speak out about discriminatory practices and 
support them in pursuing disputes. This will be an important way of empowering 
members by affirming their dignity and adding to their confidence. 
The role that unions can play, however, does not end here. The main problem noted in 
this paper is the degree of uncertainty that has been introduced into the law of unfair 
discrimination by lack of clarity in various court judgments. It is not an exaggeration to 
say that this presents a danger for employees. The prohibition of unfair discrimination in 
ILO Convention 111 and the EEA was formulated to provide employees with the greatest 
possible protection against discrimination. By not interpreting the provisions strictly, 
judges may to a greater or lesser extent substitute their own opinions for the protection 
intended by the law. Unions can help to address the problem by ensuring that cases 
brought on behalf of their members are clearly argued and by pointing courts towards a 
proper interpretation of the relevant provisions – in particular, the meaning of 
―discrimination‖. It may only need one or two well-reasoned judgments to ensure that the 




The relevant parts of ILO Convention 111 of 1958 read as follows: 
Article 1  
1. For the purpose of this Convention the term discrimination includes--  
(a) any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, 
political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or 
impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation;  
(b) such other distinction, exclusion or preference which has the effect of nullifying or impairing 
equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation as may be determined by the 
Member concerned after consultation with representative employers' and workers' organisations, 
where such exist, and with other appropriate bodies.  
2. Any distinction, exclusion or preference in respect of a particular job based on the inherent 
requirements thereof shall not be deemed to be discrimination.  
3. For the purpose of this Convention the terms employment and occupation include access to 
vocational training, access to employment and to particular occupations, and terms and conditions 
of employment.  
Article 5  
1. Special measures of protection or assistance provided for in other Conventions or 
Recommendations adopted by the International Labour Conference shall not be deemed to be 
discrimination.  
2. Any Member may, after consultation with representative employers' and workers' 
organisations, where such exist, determine that other special measures designed to meet the 
particular requirements of persons who, for reasons such as sex, age, disablement, family 
responsibilities or social or cultural status, are generally recognised to require special protection 
or assistance, shall not be deemed to be discrimination.  
 
Section 9 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.  
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, 
or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.  
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(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.  
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit 
unfair discrimination.  
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is 
established that the discrimination is fair.  
 
Section 6 of the EEA reads as follows: 
(1)  No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an employee, in any 
employment policy or practice, on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language and birth. 
(2)  It is not unfair discrimination to— 
 (a) take affirmative action measures consistent with the purpose of this Act; or 
 (b) distinguish, exclude or prefer any person on the basis of an inherent requirement 
of a job. 
(3)  Harassment of an employee is a form of unfair discrimination and is prohibited on any one, 
or a combination of grounds of unfair discrimination listed in subsection (1) 
